INTRODUCTION
Between 1933 and 1945, the Third Reich stole or otherwise wrongfully appropriated cultural property from private and public collections across Europe in a quantity and quality unprecedented in human history.' As part of a genocide of unparalleled scale, they also murdered (or forced into exile) many owners of that property. Thus, at the end of World War II, most of those best positioned to establish claims for restitution of their stolen property were unlikely to have survived. For those who did survive, or for their heirs, the practicalities of locating property and compiling evidence to support a claim for restitution were National Stolen Property Act (NSPA). Although the NSPA is not a forfeiture statute, acts indictable under the NSPA can lead to civil forfeiture under other provisions of federal law.' If the government prevails in a forfeiture action, it has authority to transfer forfeited property to the victim of the original theft-in these cases, Holocaust victims or their heirs.' Accordingly, this paper argues that in cases in which individual plaintiffs are likely to be time-barred in state courts, the United States could act on their behalf Such action is strongly supported by long-standing, clearly-articulated U.S. policies favoring restitution of Holocaust art.' However, this paper also asks whether the United States should pursue such action under the novel interpretation of the NSPA described here. That question arises out of two concerns. First, this approach of the NSPA demonstrates the difficulties of applying a general theft statute aimed at controlling the market in stolen fungible goods to unique cultural property. Second, statutes of limitations have long had powerful justifications and judicial support; an end-run around state statutes of limitations by even clear federal statutory authority raises troubling concerns.
II. DEFINING THE PROBLEM
Claims in U.S. courts for restitution of Holocaust art were rarely brought in the first half-century following the close of World War II. In addition to the profound psychological and emotional issues confronting Holocaust survivors, 9 the practicalities of learning the experience, referred to as the "conspiracy of silence," of Holocaust survivors "trying to repress the memories of and the feelings about the awful events that had occurred."); see also 
10.
Merely documenting prior ownership is a preliminary hurdle made more complicated by the loss of records of ownership. This problem is particularly acute when the original owner failed to survive the Holocaust, and heirs are unaware of their family's collections. The situation is analogous to a modus operandi for museum insider theft: the thief steals both the object and, in pre-computer registries, the museum's documentation for the object. The museum, thus, is left without knowledge that it should have the stolen object, and the object itself has disappeared. A recent instance of this practice is limitations for Holocaust art claims on grounds that it impermissibly infringed on the federal foreign affairs power-that " [i] f the Supreme Court does not correct Von Saher, then the need for Congress to enact federal legislation eliminating the statute of limitations defense in Holocaust-era art cases is acute."l 2 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Von Saher on June 27, 2011.13 In short, civil claimants now confront significant barriers based on the passage of time.
In the United States, concerted efforts to define and address the complex legal, ethical, and moral questions presented by Holocaust art did not begin until the 1990s. While some commentators have blamed the lag on Holocaust survivors' suppressed memory of events between 1933 and 1945,14 a more careful observer sees another factor. The art market in the postwar decades demonstrated an astonishing capacity to forget: Even before the war ended, and immediately after, books and widely circulating periodicals documented the massive scale of Nazi plundering. 5 The art world, though aware of war-time spoliation of cultural property, had no interest in opening that Pandora's Box. Both factors contributed to the situation in which Holocaust victims and current possessors are, today, plaintiffs and defendants.
A new wave of publications and other events in the 1990s,16 brought Holocaust art issues into a broad discussion among journalists, legal scholars, the art world, and the public. That discussion led to three significant outcomes. First, it secured a place for Holocaust art in the wider debate of restitution efforts involving other kinds of assets (e.g., life insurance, real property, bank accounts) that emerged in the 1990s among Holocaust victims, their attorneys, and policymakers." Second, it led the 
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Some current possessors have proved cooperative in efforts to balance legal and ethical issues presented by Holocaust art claims. For example, the U.S. museum community has adopted ethical standards favoring resolution of legitimate claims through mediation and acknowledging that museums may waive available defenses, such as statutes of limitations or laches. 22 The guidelines appear to have had an impact. More than eighty percent of the fifty claims involving museums have settled out of court. In all but one of those settlements either the work of art was restituted or its value (or an agreed portion of its value) was paid to the claimant. Ethical standards and professional guidelines applicable to public institutions do not, of course, bind private parties. Of the handful of claims involving individuals alleged to be in possession of Holocaust art, fewer than half have settled. Of 22. AAM's guidelines state in pertinent part: If a museum determines that an object in its collection was unlawfully appropriated during the Nazi era without subsequent restitution, the museum should seek to resolve the matter with the claimant in an equitable, appropriate, and mutually agreeable manner. . .. AAM acknowledges that in order to achieve an equitable and appropriate resolution of claims, museums may elect to waive certain available defenses.
AAM GUIDELINES, supra note 21, § 4(c), (f). AAMD's guidelines include the following language:
If a member museum should determine that a work of art in its collection was illegally confiscated during the Nazi/World The claimants alleged Mauthner parted with the painting in a coerced sale; Taylor asserted that there was no evidence of coercion or Nazi participation in the sale. 3 The claimants further alleged that the 1963 Sotheby's auction catalogue presented a patently false (or mistaken) provenance (Figure 1) Third Reich, appears on the art market twenty years after the war. It is bought, apparently in good faith, at public auction. In response to developments in the 19 9 0s, heirs of a Holocaust victim assert a claim for the painting. The court dismisses the claim as time-barred, never hearing evidence or finding facts that would establish the credibility-if any-of the claimants' allegations. 
IV. THE NATIONAL STOLEN PROPERTY ACT AND CIVIL FORFEITURE

ACTIONs
The NSPA is a general theft, criminal statute.
40
Other federal statutes authorize the government to bring civil forfeiture 39. In an influential article published early in the development of art law as a distinct academic discipline, John Henry Merryman pioneered an attempt to articulate the public's interest in works of art and other forms of cultural property. See J.H. Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural Property, 77 CAL. L. REV. 339 (1989). Professor Merryman identified three key elements of the public interest: preservation, access, and truth. Id. at 345. In this case, the financial value of the van Gogh assures that the public interest in its preservation is likely to be protected. Its aesthetic significance provides reasonable assurance that the work will eventually migrate from private hands into a museum collection where the public will have access to it. However, the public interest of truth has been and will remain badly served. The procedural stance of the case required the court to accept the claimants' allegations as true. There was no opportunity for the opposing parties to present evidence and for a neutral fact-finder to weigh that evidence. Thus, the opportunity to determine what actually happened to the work during the Third Reich has been, of legal necessity, postponed to a later time when documents, memories, and other potential evidence may be even less available. That delay diminishes the possibility that the work's history will ever be clarified. Such in rem forfeiture actions proceed independently of, and do not require the government to pursue, an in personam criminal proceeding under the NSPA. 42 Accordingly, the government has significant discretion in applying the NSPA: It can prosecute the person involved in the illegal act, initiate civil forfeiture proceedings against the property involved, or both. 43 This flexibility, of course, provides the government with significant negotiating leverage. 42. See, e.g ., Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397 (1938) (holding that acquittal on a criminal charge did not bar a civil forfeiture proceeding against the property involved in the alleged crime); United States v. U.S. Currency, 626 F.2d 11, 12 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination did not require dismissal of a forfeiture proceeding to recover the property involved in the alleged crime). Cassella observes generally: "civil forfeiture cases do not require a criminal conviction and proceed independent of any criminal trial." Cassella, supra note 42, at 132.
43. Additionally, the United States can bring criminal forfeiture proceedings if it pursues a criminal indictment under the NSPA:
Section 981(a)(1)(C) . . . is a civil forfeiture statute. Standing alone, it does not authorize criminal forfeiture. But 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) has been amended to authorize the criminal forfeiture of any property for which civil forfeiture is authorized. Therefore, taken together, these two statutes authorize the intended] so that the section will reach persons who knowingly possess stolen property that has moved in interstate or foreign commerce as well as those who receive, conceal, or store such property. While obviously a person who possesses such property must have received it, a successful prosecution of a receipt-of-stolen-property case requires proof that the person received the property in the district of prosecution. The addition of a possession offense eliminates the requirement that the government prove that the defendant first received the stolen property in a particular district, an element which is sometimes difficult to prove and which has no bearing on the defendant's criminal culpability." (citation omitted)). 50. Congress explained its legislative purpose as follows: The second change, which is related to the first [adding "possession" to the statute], eliminates the present requirement that the property still be considered as moving in interstate or foreign commerce at the time the defendant receives, conceals, or disposes of it. Although the courts have construed the "in commerce" requirement broadly, this requirement is also unnecessarily burdensome and is unrelated to the blameworthiness of the defendant's conduct. [Vol. XXII:1I 16 effect, a new violation that continuously restarts the statute of limitations, which is "five years after the time when the alleged offense was discovered . . . ."' Moreover, Congress eliminated the argument that the statute of limitations commenced when stolen property left interstate commerce: 18 U.S.C. § 2315 now requires proof only that the property crossed a state or U.S. boundary after it was stolen. That fact, once it has occurred, never changes. Thus, the only way a current possessor can start the statute of limitations running against the government is to dispossess herself of the stolen property.
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A broader interpretation of these amendments, discussed below, leads to the conclusion that they transform stolen goods into contraband: property to which one may even have good title but not a right of possession. the amendments made by this Act shall apply to any forfeiture proceeding commenced on or after the date that is 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act"). As an alternative to the five-year period, the government can initiate a timely forfeiture action "within 2 years after the time when the involvement of the property in the alleged offense was discovered, whichever was later. . . ." 19 U.S.C. § 1621. The "alleged offense" is the illicit possession of stolen property, which is ongoing-as opposed to receipt, for example, which may have occurred at a moment or over a short period more than five years prior to the forfeiture action. See, e.g., United States v. 5443 Suffield Terrace, 607 F.3d 504, 508 (7th Cir. 2010) (stating that "[w]hen there are multiple, distinct underlying crimes that independently could support forfeiture of the same property, nothing in the plain language of § 1621 bars a court from adjudicating a forfeiture action as long as at least one alleged offense is not time-barred, even if the statute of limitations has run on the remainder of the underlying crimes" and upholding the forfeiture action "based not on [the claimant's] attempted smuggling of cigars into the country in April 1996, but on the discovery of smuggled cigars in his house in March 1997 and October 1999").
52. See Trupin, 117 F.3d at 686-87 (affirming the defendant's conviction for possession of art he knew to be stolen after Congress amended the NSPA in 1986 to add possession as an actionable offense and holding that, to avoid conviction, the defendant would have had to cease "his possession within a reasonable time after the 1986 amendment").
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Although the United States has alleged violations of the NSPA in three civil forfeiture cases involving Holocaust art, those allegations involved underlying offenses of the receipt or transport of stolen property.
54 This section describes the NSPA's potential role in situations in which there has been long-term possession rather than recent receipt or sale. That role will be explored here through the lens of a hypothetical case based on the alleged facts presented in Adler.
In considering Taylor's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6), the district court was required to assume that the claimants' allegations were true.
55
And for purposes of its review, the Ninth Circuit assumed that the claimants' allegations were "true and that Mauthner was coerced into giving up the painting before she left Germany. 
A. United States v. One van Gogh Painting in the Absence of Adler
What would the outcome of a civil forfeiture proceeding against the van Gogh have been had the United States brought an action in place of Adler?
Procedurally, a civil forfeiture action predicated on a violation of the NSPA is straightforward. It commences with the issuance of a warrant."
To obtain a warrant, the government must demonstrate to a magistrate judge that probable cause exists to seize the property." In the subsequent forfeiture proceedings, the that all facts stated in the complaint are true and that they are provable by admissible evidence. . . . We assume, for the purposes of our discussion, that the allegations of the complaint are true and that Mauthner was coerced into giving up the painting before she left Germany."). 
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[Vol. XXII:l government carries the initial burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the seized property was involved in an act that violated the NSPA. 59 Once the government provides that proof, the burden shifts to the claimant to prove either that the work is not subject to forfeiture 60 or that the claimant is an "innocent owner." 6 ' If the government prevails in the forfeiture proceeding, title to the property passes to the United 
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DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [2016] 67. This assumption seems reasonable but not beyond doubt. The NSPA defines value to mean "the face, par, or market value, whichever is the greatest." more difficult questions are whether the van Gogh was, and whether Taylor knew it to be, stolen.
For purposes of applying the NSPA, the Southern District of New York recently observed:
Under [precedent in the Fifth, Second, and Eleventh Circuits], federal law controls the question of whether an item is stolen, and local law . .. controls the analytically prior issues of (a) whether any person or entity has a property interest in the item such that it can be stolen, and (b) whether the receiver of the item has a property interest [in] it."
Federal courts have given exceptionally broad scope to the term "stolen" in NSPA cases. The Supreme Court set the bar in a case involving the predecessor statute to the NSPA (the National Motor Vehicle Act), holding that "'[s]tolen' as used in [the statute] includes all felonious takings . . . with intent to deprive the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership, regardless of whether or not the theft constitutes common-law larceny."
69 In a recent case involving Holocaust art, the court observed:
While the NSPA does not define "stolen," the Court of Appeals has held that the term should be broadly construed to encompass "'all felonious takings ... with intent to deprive the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership, regardless of whether or not the theft constitutes common-law larceny."' Its meaning does not depend on "the archaic distinctions between larceny by trespass, larceny by trick, embezzlement and obtaining properly by false [Vol. XXII:1I 22
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DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [2016] , Art. 2 https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol22/iss1/2 pretenses." Rather, determination of whether property is "stolen" in the NSPA context depends on "whether there has been some sort of interference with a property interest." An item is stolen if it "belonged to someone who did not . . . consent" to its being taken. 70 How do these precedents apply? The core of the claimants' allegations was that the van Gogh left the family's possession as the result of a "coerced sale," that is, without voluntary consent." The van Gogh catalogues raisonn6s of 1928 and 1939 establish Mauthner's "property interest" in the painting.
7 2 A coerced sale would clearly constitute a sale without voluntary consent, that is, "some sort of interference with a property right."" Thus, the allegations, if proven, would establish that the painting was "stolen" within the meaning of the NSPA.
The question, then, is whether the painting ever ceased to be do not contend that the painting was confiscated by the Nazis. Rather, they allege economic coercion, contending that Mauthner sold the painting 'under duress."'). Nazi spoliation ranged from outright confiscation to coerced sales. The first case in a United States court to recover Holocaust art involved a work taken from the plaintiffs' home and for which the Nazi agents issued a receipt. See Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 806 (Sup. Ct. 1966) . Claims involving coerced sales, for which extant records are unlikely, are necessarily more complex.
And even with documentation of a sale, circumstances of coercion are unlikely to be evidenced in the sales documents. As one commentator noted, "Although it is clear that claims based on confiscation are limited to theft, looting, and forcible physical possession . .. it is unclear just how far the concept of coercion extends in this unique context." Adler, supra note 25, at 57-58. Complaint, supra note 29, 118. 73. See supra quoted paragraph accompanying note 71. 1 am unaware of a case addressing the specific question whether a coerced sale transforms the sold goods into "stolen" goods for purposes of the NSPA. Given federal courts' broad reading of the term "stolen" in NSPA cases, however, it is reasonable to conclude that a court would find a coerced sale a sufficient "interference with a property right" to have that effect.
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Under the common law, "one cannot be convicted of receiving stolen goods if, before the stolen goods reached the receiver, the goods had been recovered by their owner or his agent, including the police." This doctrine . . . is well-established federal law; federal courts routinely apply it in cases involving federal statutes that prohibit the receipt or transportation of stolen goods without inquiring into whether the doctrine is part of the relevant body of local law, as they would have to do if local law controlled this issue.
The reciprocal conclusion is implicit: Until a stolen work is returned to the owner from whom it had been wrongfully taken (or to the owner's agent), it remains stolen for NSPA purposes. Accordingly, assuming the allegations to be true and provable, the van Gogh remains stolen.
The next question is whether Taylor had the requisite knowledge to satisfy the NSPA's scienter requirement. The government's burden is to prove only that a possessor "knows" the property is All would agree that at some point in time the goods in this case ceased being stolen goods. We must decide at what point thee goods lost that status in contemplation of the law. We feel the best an only workable rule is the common law rule viz, the goods lost their stolen character immediately upon being recovered by the owner or his agent. Id. at 681. "stolen, unlawfully converted, or taken." " That is, the government must demonstrate that the defendant has "factual knowledge [that the good is stolen] as distinguished from knowledge of the law."" Knowledge that property was stolen "'may be inferred from circumstances that would convince a man of ordinary intelligence that this is the fact."'" Moreover, afteracquired knowledge meets the scienter requirement, even if the government is the source of that information" and even if the period between acquisition of the goods and acquisition of knowledge that they are stolen is many years. 79 The government There was evidence . . . that appellant acquired knowledge that the turkeys had been stolen after he had received them; for example, that such knowledge was acquired by means of or as a result of appellant's interviews . . . with two separate teams of F.B.I. agents who questioned him about stolen "Lynbrook" turkeys .... For an example of how CAFRA's innocent owner defense intersects with the NSPA scienter requirement, see supra note 62.
79. In a contract dispute that turned on whether the property was stolen within the meaning of the NSPA, the court held that knowledge that a may demonstrate scienter by proving that a defendant with reason to suspect a theft acted with deliberate ignorance or conscious avoidance to prevent discovering that the property is stolen."o Under the alleged facts, there are three occasions when "a person of ordinary intelligence" might have learned the van Gogh was stolen. The first is at the time of public auction in 1963; the second, when Taylor attempted to sell the work in 1990; and the third, when the claimants demanded return of the painting in 2003 and filed a complaint for its return in 2004.
As to the first, the question is whether incorrect information and errors in the work's provenance published in the 1963 Sotheby's sales catalogue sufficed to alert a person of ordinary intelligence that the work was stolen."' For at least two reasons, the answer to that question is likely no. First, as discussed above, the art market in the decades following the war paid scant attention to the recent history of Nazi looting: There appears to be no evidence of heightened scrutiny of works whose provenance indicated German ownership during the Third Reich. Even had the errors been noticed, there is nothing to suggest that collectors would have interpreted them as evidence of Nazi looting. Second, standards for diligence in the acquisition of art were not what they are today: The first scholarly article on the topic appeared only in 1990.82 seventeenth-century Benin bronze statue acquired more than ten years after the plaintiff acquired the object satisfied the scienter requirement. Hartman v. Harris, 810 F. Supp. 82, 83, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) . Because the other elements of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 were met, the court found that a contract regarding the statue was illegal, and thus void and unenforceable. Id. at 85. Further bolstering the court's conclusion that the plaintiff knew the statue was stolen was that an art dealer told the plaintiff it was stolen some years after the plaintiff had acquired it, and the plaintiff had The art market of the 1960s simply did not work on the basis of diligence; it worked on understandings." Accordingly, it is difficult to see a court determining that in 1963 Taylor had knowledge, or sufficient information to warrant diligent investigation, of a link between the work and Nazi looting.
In 1990, when Taylor offered the van Gogh for sale at auction in London, Christie's sales catalogue corrected errors in the work's provenance that appeared in the 1963 Sotheby's catalogue. 84 Whether those corrections constitute sufficient circumstances to "convince a person of ordinary intelligence" that the work was stolen or justify a conscious avoidance instruction is unclear and probably doubtful. Although Taylor had had twenty-seven years to investigate the work's history, no claim for the painting had been asserted during those three decades despite the notoriety of Taylor's ownership of it." Moreover, as discussed above, the We have just completed a journey through the fantasy land of marketing in the fine arts. Prestigious names have been dropped freely as rain. Large sums of money or negotiable paper have changed hands suddenly. Finally, in December 2003, the claimants made a demand on Taylor for return of the van Gogh following which there were failed negotiations; in 2004, the parties filed suit. 86 The claimants' demand and subsequent filing of a complaint in court would not by themselves prove that Taylor had either actual knowledge or an obligation to investigate the allegations to obviate a later assertion of conscious avoidance of the truth. However, if the United States had demonstrated probable cause to a magistrate that the work was stolen and then fully informed Taylor of the evidence it had regarding the work's provenance, it would be hard to conclude that Taylor did not then learn-did not "know"-that the work was stolen or, in the absence of a diligent effort to make an independent determination, that Taylor did not consciously avoid learning the truth." Accordingly, there would have been no impediment to the United States' prevailing in a civil forfeiture action against the van Gogh. All elements of an indictable act under the NSPA are present and the action would not be time-barred.
If the government prevailed, title to the painting would, as a matter of law, transfer to the United States, which would then have the option of transferring its title to the claimants, thereby accomplishing restitution and achieving, in this instance, longstanding United States public policy."
B. United States v. One van Gogh Painting Following Adler
The more difficult question is whether Taylor's having prevailed in the civil action immunizes the van Gogh from a subsequent federal civil forfeiture action. defense vest her with good title to the van Gogh? Second, even if the answer is yes, does the van Gogh nevertheless remain "stolen" for purposes of the NSPA? The answer to the first question is uncertain under applicable (California) law; however, even if the answer were yes-that the judgment vested good title in Taylorunder federal law the work remains "stolen" for purposes of the NSPA: It has not yet been returned to the Mauthner family or its agent. Put another way, even if the effect of the California civil action were to vest good title to the painting in Taylor, for purposes of the NSPA it remains stolen. Accordingly, the painting can not legally be possessed by anyone other than the claimants or their agent: Good title under state law provides no defense for possession of federally-defined contraband." California courts have proved skeptical of the argument that California law allows a possessor to acquire title to chattel by the passage of time, and have failed to respond fully to the merits of the claim. 90 The question rose to national prominence in 1980 in a case involving stolen paintings by Georgia O'Keeffe. There, the New Jersey Supreme Court abolished application of adverse possession to stolen art and instituted a discovery rule standard for determining ownership rights as between a theft victim and a subsequent possessor. (The discovery rule, by statute or common law, is today the majority rule and applies in California.) However, the New Jersey Supreme Court was unable to articulate a rule of law supporting the assertion that expiration of a statute of limitations under a discovery rule vests good title:
89. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich under California law one could "acquire title to personal property by adverse possession" but recognizing that case law has "cast some doubt upon this conclusion").
[T]he effect of the expiration of the statute of limitations, albeit on the theory of adverse possession, has been not only to bar an action for possession, but also to vest title in the possessor. There is no reason to change that result although the discovery rule has replaced adverse possession. History, reason, and common sense support the conclusion that the expiration of the statute of limitations bars the remedy to recover possession and also vests title in the possessor. Even conjoined, "history, reason, and common sense" do not comprise a sound legal argument. Indeed, in a case involving a museum's attempt to quiet title of allegedly stolen coins, a California court of appeal praised New York's "demand and refusal rule" primarily because it works in direct opposition to the logic presented in O'Keeffe:
We note that under New York's demand rule of accrual, the limitations period commences upon the owner's demand for the return of the stolen property, without regard to the owner's diligence in locating the property. New York's demand rule of accrual precludes a thief from, in effect, laundering stolen property by waiting out the civil limitations period and then fencing the goods free and clear of the owner's lawful title. New York thus avoids the prospect of allowing the person in possession of the stolen property to acquire, in effect, stolen property by expiration of the statute of limitations. would that ruling have on a federal action based on a violation of the NSPA? In brief, none.
In applying the NSPA, federal law determines whether a work is stolen and whether and when it is no longer stolen. 93 Thus, even if state law vested good title to stolen property in a party who has successfully asserted a statute of limitations defense, a federal court interpreting the NSPA looks to federal, not state, law to determine whether the work remains stolen. 94 As discussed above, if the claimants' allegations were proven, the van Gogh fits well within the definition that courts have given to "stolen" in NSPA cases: Mauthner held an interest in the painting, and that interest was interfered with. The painting has not been returned to the Mauthner family or its agent, the only way property can shed the taint of being stolen under the NSPA." Thus, until the painting is restituted, it is, at law, property to which one may have good title but not a right of possession. In short, it is contraband.
Justice Stevens, in his vigorous dissent in Bennis v. Michigan, 9 6 articulated what is now the standard, tripartite classification of contraband: "pure contraband; proceeds of criminal activity; and tools of the criminal's trade."" Examples of pure contrabandthat is, "'objects the possession of which, without more, constitutes a crime"'-include "adulterated food, sawed-off shotguns, narcotics, and smuggled goods."" Stevens observed that "the government has an obvious remedial interest in removing reference to the statutory authorities that transform chattel into "pure contraband," those statutes are easily found; some refer explicitly to the identified goods as "contraband" and others simply criminalize possession of them.o In 1986, Congress added a new item to the list of contraband property: stolen goods as defined in the NSPA.i 0 Accordingly, it is well within a reasonable interpretation of the NSPA and precedent to conclude that the United States could prevail in a civil forfeiture action against the van Gogh even after Adler. Congress may not have intended that result when it criminalized possession of stolen goods and eliminated the defense that goods were no longer in interstate commerce. Indeed, the result could strike a reasonable person as being more than unreasonable. But the jurisprudence that has arisen under the NSPA's long history and the 1986 amendments to the statute, compel this conclusion: The United States has clear statutory authority to achieve restitution of the van Gogh. buying, or selling of merchandise imported or brought into the United States "contrary to law" and instructing that "[p]roof of defendant's possession of such goods, unless explained to the satisfaction of the jury, shall be deemed evidence sufficient to authorize conviction for violation of this section").
101. Although the van Gogh fits within Justice Stevens' first category, it falls also within the second: "The second category-proceeds [of criminal activity]-traditionally covered only stolen property, whose return to its original owner has a powerful restitutionary justification." Bennis, 516 U.S. at 459 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
VI. THE EQUITIES: APPLYING UNITED STATES LAW TO ACCOMPLISH UNITED STATES POLICY
The NSPA's purposes and language fully support the United States' active use of civil forfeiture proceedings based on NSPA violations to achieve restitution of Holocaust art. The question remains whether the United States should bring such forfeiture actions. On the one hand, for more than 60 years it has been explicit executive branch policy to support restitution efforts,'o 2 which would argue for an affirmative answer. On the other, applying a federal statute that effectively eliminates a statute-oflimitations defense conflicts with strong, historic policy rationales for legislative enactment and judicial enforcement of statutes of limitation: avoiding stale lawsuits and prompting those with claims to come forward expeditiously.' 3 Those policies argue for a negative answer. Moreover, the legislative history of Congress's 1986 amendments to the NSPA, indicates no awareness of the potential difficulties and unanticipated outcomes of applying a general theft statute to works of art, which differ significantly from other kinds of "goods." 104. Although the government has not applied the amended NSPA as described in this paper, it has brought two cases involving stolen art that would not have been feasible prior to the 1986 amendments. See United States v.
Department of State cosponsored the first international conference to address these issues. At the conclusion of that meeting, approximately forty governments promulgated the Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art, which emphasized the importance of identifying Holocaust art and assisting those seeking their looted property.
Principle eight (of eleven) recommends that "steps should be taken expeditiously to achieve a just and fair solution" when a match between claimant and property occurs. 109 Two years later the United States participated in the Vilnius International Forum, and joined approximately forty governments in signing the Vilnius Forum Declaration, whose first principle states:
The Vilnius Forum asks all governments to undertake every reasonable effort to achieve the restitution of cultural assets looted during the Holocaust era to the original owners or their heirs. To this end, it encourages all participating States to take all reasonable measures to implement the Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art as well as Resolution 1205 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe."o Most recently and most importantly, in 2009, the United States joined forty-five other countries in promulgating the Terezin Declaration, a document prepared at the Prague Holocaust Era Assets Conference. In signing this Declaration, the United States committed itself to a remarkable goal: assuring that the U.S. legal 109. Washington Principles, supra note 1089, 8 ("If the pre-War owners of art that is found to have been confiscated by the Nazis and not subsequently restituted, or their heirs, can be identified, steps should be taken expeditiously to achieve a just and fair solution, recognizing this may vary according to the facts and circumstances surrounding a specific case.").
110. Vilnius Declaration, supra note 108, 1. successfully placed the NSPA at the center of U.S. efforts to control the trade in illicit antiquities. When the Department of Justice started to apply the NSPA in this unprecedented way, the result was so stunning as to prompt Judge Minor Wisdom, in the first case of its kind to reach a Circuit court,"' to open his opinion as follows: "[m]useum directors, art dealers, and innumerable private collectors throughout this country must have been in a state of shock when they read the news if they did of the convictions of the five defendants in this case.""' The U.S. has brought such actions even in situations in which foreign nation could have brought a civil action against the U.S. possessor and even when such action would not have been time-barred."
6 Thus the question arises: If the United States has been willing, indeed eager, to apply the NSPA in novel ways for one form of cultural property (antiquities), why could it not-or, better, why has it not-been equally innovative in applying the NSPA in Holocaust art cases?
In short it is difficult to see any reason why the United States should not pursue the approach described in this paper. That approach may be the only avenue available to assure that Holocaust art claims are, in the words of the Terezin Declaration, decided "on the facts and merits of the claims."" in the past, been stolen.
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Above all, it is the characteristic of ars longa that collides uncomfortably with Congress's having effectively eliminated a time bar to U.S. action under the NSPA for knowing possession of stolen goods.
Elsewhere, I have argued that for purposes of regulating traffic in illicitly exported antiquities the NSPA is unwieldy-either too broad or too narrow depending on how one interprets the two circuit court decisions that addressed the issue.121 In the case of Elizabeth Taylor's van Gogh, the NSPA appears equally unwieldy but for other reasons: Its use defeats state statutes of limitations even in a case in which all of the arguments favoring statutes of limitations are present: Witnesses are dead, evidence is cold, and memories are either weak or nonexistent.
Under these circumstances the opportunity for fraud increases and a court's ability to determine what actually happened diminishes. In short, the very nature of the van Gogh as an enduring work of art and the belief that time eventually shifts the balance of equities in favor of the status quo both argue against application of the NSPA in these circumstances.
Put another way, repose has its place in commercial and civic life.
VII. CLOSE
As discussed above, most new claims brought by Holocaust victims or their heirs against U.S. possessors to recover Nazilooted art will confront potentially insurmountable defenses based on the passage of time. Civil forfeiture proceedings predicated on knowing possession of stolen goods in violation of the NSPA offer an alternative route to restitution under these circumstances. Indeed, it may well be the only route to accomplish what the United States, under the Washington Principles and the Terezin Declaration, committed itself to achieving, just and fair solutions of Holocaust art claims. The hard question remains, of course, 120. Indeed, under the broad judicial interpretation of "stolen" for purposes of the NSPA vast amounts of cultural property have, sometime in their history, been wrongfully taken.
121. See Urice, supra note 113, at 159.
